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Abstract 
This paper investigates a purely qualitative 
version of Savage's theory for decision mak­
ing under uncertainty. Until now, most rep­
resentation theorems for preference over acts 
rely on a numerical representation of util­
ity and uncertainty where utility and uncer­
tainty are commensurate. Disrupting the tra­
dition, we relax this assumption and intro­
duce a purely ordinal axiom requiring that 
the Decision Maker (DM) preference between 
two acts only depends on the relative position 
of their consequences for each state. Within 
this qualitative framework, we determine the 
only possible form of the decision rule and in­
vestigate some instances compatible with the 
transitivity of the strict preference. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In the field of decision making under uncertainty, sev­
eral studies have been carried out to justify the use of 
this or that decision criterion for the comparison of al­
ternatives. Each decision criterion is justified by a set 
of axioms capturing part of the decision behaviour of 
the DM. Among the most classical studies in this direc­
tion are the seminal works of Von Neumann and Mor­
genstern (1947) and Savage (1954). Such approaches 
rely on the use of a quantitative criterion for the com­
parison of alternatives whose justification requires sev­
eral strong assumptions. For instance, the axiom sys­
tem usually implies that the subjective value attached 
to each consequence can be quantified, as well as the 
likelihood of the possible events. However, in practi­
cal applications, the elicitation of the information re­
quired by a quantitative model cannot always be as­
sessed. This is why some alternative models have been 
proposed in AI, relying on a more ordinal representa­
tion of preferences and uncertainty (e.g the qualitative 
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utility proposed by Dubois and Prade (1995)). 
Even if qualitative utility mainly relies on the use of 
ordinal information (preference order on consequences, 
relative likelihood of events) it shares a common fea­
ture with the expected utility criterion: the commen­
surability of the preference scale and the uncertainty 
scale used in the model. Recent works in AI propose 
to escape this assumption in two different ways. The 
first one is to compare two acts on the basis of their 
consequences in the most plausible states of the world 
(Boutilier (1994); Tan and Pearl (1994); Brafman and 
Tennenholtz (1996), (1997)). The other way is to rely 
on a decision rule that compares the plausibility of the 
sets of states in which one act has a better consequence 
than the other (see Dubois et a!. ( 1997)). This rule has 
been originally proposed in a possibilitic framework, 
but could be easily extended to other uncertainty re­
lations, thus defining other preference models. The 
aim of the present paper is to provide an unified ax­
iomatic framework for these kind of rules and to study 
their ability to describe the DM preferences. 
In the next section, we present various quantitative 
and qualitative models for decision making under un­
certainty and discuss the necessity of making prefer­
ence and uncertainty commensurate. In Section 3, an 
axiomatic framework for purely qualitative preference 
models is introduced and the structure of qualitative 
decision rules is characterized. In Section 4 we char­
acterize the qualitative decision rules compatible with 
the transitivity of the strict preference. Finally, in Sec­
tion 5, we discuss some variations of our framework 
and propose a new family of qualitative decision rules 
compatible with the transitivity requirement. Notice 
that in order to save space, all the proofs are omitted. 
2 EXAMPLES AND MOTIVATIONS 
Decision Making under uncertainty implies a choice 
among a set of potential acts (decisions) whose conse­
quences are not perfectly known. From a formal point 
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of view, such a decision problem is characterized by a 
set S of states representing the possible situations (or 
decision contexts), a set X of possible consequences, 
and a set of acts viewed as elements of X 5 (i.e. an 
act is a mapping f : S � X where f(s) represents 
the consequence of act f for any state s E S). In this 
paper, S and X are supposed to be finite1 . Thus, 
if X= {xJ, ... ,xm} and S = {s1, ... ,sn}, an act 
f E X5 is completely characterized by the vector of 
consequences (f(si), ... , f(sn)) 
Denoting � the DM's preference relation over acts, we 
define the indifference relation �, and a strict prefer­
ence relation >- by: 
f � g ¢::;. f � g and g � f 
f >- g ¢::;. f � g and not(g � f) 
The role of decision analysis is to construct a model 
of DM's preferences �, including his subjectivity in 
the evaluation of possible events and consequences of 
alternatives, so as to be able to use this model to sup­
port the decision making process. Several preference 
models have been proposed in this direction, that are 
all based on a decision rule of the following form: 
f � g ¢::;. x( f(s!), ... , f(sn), g(sJ), ... , g(sn)) (I) 
where X is a comparison function defined from X2n to 
{0, 1} (0 for 'false' and 1 for 'true'). Now we distin­
guish two types of models corresponding to two differ­
ent instances of equation (1). 
2. 1 PREFERENCE MODELS BASED ON 
A VALUE FUNCTION 
These models are characterized by the definition of 
a value function v : X5 � Y where Y is an or­
dered set and v(f) measures the subjective attrac­
tiveness of f for the DM. In such models, v(f) = 
1/J(f(si), . . .  , f(sn)) where 1/J is an aggregation function 
defined from xn to Y. These models are characterized 
by the following instance of equation ( 1) 
where 'P is a comparison function defined from Y2 to 
{0, 1}. Let us recall some well known examples: 
2. 1.1 The Expected Utility 
This model is based on a utility function u : 
X >-+ [0, 1] measuring the subjective attractiveness 
of any consequence x E X and a probability dis­
tribution p on S defined by the given of the vec­
tor (p(s1), . . •  ,p(sn)). In this probabilistic model 
1This differs from Savage's original framework for deci­
sion making under uncertainty 
¢(z1, ... , Zn) = 2::�=! p(si)u(zi). This defines a cri­
terion v(f) for any f E X5 by: 
v(f) = LP(s)u(f(s)) (2) 
sES 
2. 1. 2 The Qualitative Utilities 
The pessimistic qualitative utility (see e.g. Dubois and 
Prade (1995); Dubois et al. (1998)) is based on a util­
ity function u : X >-+ [0, 1] measuring the attractive­
ness of a consequence x E X and a possibility distri-
bution 1r on S defined by the vector (1r(s1), ... , 7r(sn)). 
In this model ¢(z1, . . . , zn) = mini=I ... .. n max{l -
1r(si)), u(z;)}. This defines the pessimistic criterion 
v-(f) for any f E X5 by: 
v-(f) = min max{1- 1r(s),u(f(s))} (3) sES 
This criterion is actually a weighted extension of the 
Wald criterion and, to some extent, it is " more quali­
tative" than the standard expected utility. 
The optimistic qualitative utility model (see e.g.; 
Dubois and Prade (1995); Dubois, et a! (1998)) is a 
variation of the previous model, and as such, it re­
quires the same utility function and the same pos­
sibility distribution. This model is characterized by 
¢(z1, ... ,zn) = maxi=!, ... ,n min{7r(s;) , u(z;)} . This 
defines the optimistic qualitative criterion v+ (f): 
= max min{1r(s), u(f(s))} sES 
2.2 THE COMMENSURABILITY 
HYPOTHESIS 
(4) 
Let us underline some implicit assumptions in decision 
models based on value functions, namely the commen­
surability between preference and uncertainty, and, for 
the expected utility model, the cardinality of utilities. 
Suppose that the DM's preference over X are known 
and can be represented by the weak-order �P (�P is 
precisely the order encoded by the utility function). 
Simllarily, suppose that the subjective likelihood of 
each event for the DM is known and is described by a 
binary uncertainty relation �u on 25 (e.g. represented 
by the probability /possibility /necessity measure). 
Example 1 Let us consider a decision problem with 
two states { s1, s2} which are seen as equally plausible 
by the decision maker (i.e. s1 �u s2 and s2 �u s1) 
and a set of consequences X= {x!,X2,xa,x4} such 
that x1 >- p x2 >- p x3 >- p X4. Let us consider two 
different utility functions u1 and u2 that could be used 
to encode the preference order >-p: 
XJ X2 X3 X4 
UJ 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.3 
u2 0. 7 0.6 0.4 0.1 
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In this paper, we denote !IAd2A2, ... , An-d nAn the 
act whose result is fi(s) if s E At, 'lfi = 1, ... , n, 
for any partition A1, ... , An-1, An of the set of 
states. Consider the acts f = x1 { 81 }x4 { s2} and g = 
x2 {8!}x3 {82}. Suppose now that we want to use the 
expected utility model to compare f and g. The prob­
ability distribution on S must be p(8I) = p(82) = 0.5. 
Using function u1 in equation {2) we get the expected 
values v1 (f) = 0.6, v1 (g) = 0.5. Performing the same 
operations with u2 yields to v2(!) = 0.4, v2(g) = 0.5. 
Therefore we get f >-- g with u1 and g >-- f with u2 . 
Hence, when using expected utility, the preference over 
acts depends on the particular utility function chosen 
to encode the preference order >--p. This shows that 
this model exploits an extra information not contained 
in relations '(,p and ';::::,u. This is due to the cardinal 
interpretation of utility grades and to their interlace­
ment with the probabilities. 
In this example, whenever we use a possibility distribu­
tion 1r to describe our knowledge about the plausibility 
of events, we have to set: 1r(s1) = 1r(82) = 1. Then, 
the pessimistic qualitative utility gives: v] (f) = 0.3 
and the v] (g) = 0.4 from u1 and therefore g >-- f ,  and 
we get exactly the same preference with function u2 
since v;;(f) = 0.1 and the v;;(g) = 0.4. Thus, on this 
example where the initial information (represented by 
relations '(,p and ';::::,u) is purely ordinal, using qualita­
tive utility seems more natural than expected utility. 
From such an example, we could infer that this ordinal 
model is purely qualitative. However, things are less 
elementary, as shown in the following example. 
Example 2 Suppose now that s1 >--u 82 in example 1 
and consider the following utility functions: 
X! X2 X3 X4 
UI 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
u2 o.g 0.8 0.7 0.6 
We want now to compare the acts f and g on the ba­
sis of the pessimistic qualitative utility model. Let us 
choose an arbitrary possibility distribution on S to rep­
resent the likelihood weak-order on ';::::,u, e.g 1r(81) = 1 
and 1r(82) = 0.5. Hence, using function u1 in equa­
tion (3) we get the expected values v] (f) "' 0.4, 
vj(g) = 0.3. Performing the same operations with 
function u2 yields to v;;(f) == 0.6, v;;(g) "'0.7. There­
fore we get f >-- g with v] and g >-- f with v;;. 
This example shows that models based on qualita­
tive utility also exploit an extra information not con­
tained in relations '(,p and ';::::,u, namely their interlace­
ment. Indeed, in such models, utility and possibility 
are commensurate and represented on a common or­
dinal scale P U .  On this scale, the use of function u1 
yields to the following order: 8I >-- PU 82 >--PU XI >-- PU 
x2 >--PU X3 >--PU X4 whereas function u2 yields to: 
81 ?-PU XI ?-PU X2 ?-PU X3 )-- PU X4 ?-PU 82. This 
explains the difference of result. Constructing relation 
>-- PU from >--u and >--p requires additional information 
which must be elicited by questioning the DM. In the 
following Section, we introduce simple models avoiding 
the definition of relation ';::Pu. 
2.3 PREFERENCE MODELS BASED ON 
PAIRWISE COMPARISONS 
We consider here models characterized by the following 
general instance of equation ( 1). 
f ';::::, g <==> <p1[1/J[<p(/(8I ), g(si)), ... , <p(f(8n), g(sn))], 
1/![<p(g(81), /(8I) ), ... , <p(g(8n), f(8n))]] 
where <p and <p1 are comparison functions and 1/! is an 
aggregation function. When the preferences over X 
are represented by the weak-order '(,p we can choose: 
Now, if we assume that the subjective likelihood of 
each event for the DM are described by a binary un­
certainty relation ';::::,u on 25, then for any pair of events 
A, B seen as elements of 25 and characterized by vec­
tors (a I ,  ... , an) and (b1, ... , bn) respectively, we can 
define function 1/J so as to satisfy the condition: 
This yields to the following general decision rule: 
I ';::::, g <==> [! '(,p g] ';::::,u [g '(,p / ]  (5) 
where[! '(,p g] = {8 E S,/ (8) '(,p g(8)}. This general 
Lifting Rule, proposed by Dubois and a!. (1997), can 
be seen as the counterpart of majority rules in social 
choice theory (see e.g Bordes (1983)). 
The Probabilistic Lifting rule , can be represented by 
a function 1/J defined by: 
¢(a1, ... ,an)= L p(8j) 
{j:a;=l} 
where p is a probability distribution on S. 
The Necessity Lifting rule, corresponds to : 
1/J(ai, .. . , an)= min (1- 1r(sj)) {J:a,=O} 
where 1r is a possibility distribution on S. Symmetri­
cally, we can propose a new Possibilistic Lifting Rule, 
represented by a function 1/! defined by: 
1/!(ai, ... ,an)= max 7r(8j) {J:a;=l} 
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Possibilistic and necessity lifting rules yield to a rela­
tion >;.:, whose asymmetric part is transitive but that 
this is not the case for the probabilistic lifting. These 
three rules yield to a complete relation >;.:,, however 
we can consider more general lifting rules yielding to 
incomplete preference structures. For example, one 
can consider a family of possibilitity distributions, and 
state that f is preferred to g iff, for each possibility 
distribution in the family, the possibilit of [! >;.:,p g] is 
greater than the possibility of [g >;.:,p f ]. 
Finally, notice that the preference inversions observed 
in example 1 and 2 cannot occur when using lifting 
rules because, by definition, the preference over acts 
only depends on relations >;.:,u and >;.:,p. In this respect, 
preference models based on a lifting rule can be seen 
as purely qualitative models. 
3 A QUALITATIVE VERSION OF 
SAVAGE's FRAMEWORK 
This Section aims at providing an axiomatic frame­
work for qualitative preference models and to derive 
representation theorems for purely qualitative prefer­
ences. Following Savage we start from a user-driven 
preference relation over acts, and define axioms that 
this preference relation should satisfy to be a quali­
tative and "rational" model. Under such axioms, it 
is possible to construct a preference relation >;.:,p on 
the consequences, a likelihood relation >;.:,£ on events, 
and a decision rule based on these two relations that 
perfectly describes the DMs preferences. Let us first 
recall a part of the axioms proposed by Savage (1954) 
to characterize the expected utility model (2). 
3. 1 SAVAGE's AXIOMS 
Axiom Sl. (X5, >;.:,) is a weakly ordered space (>;.:, is 
complete, reflexive, transitive) 
Such an axiom in Savage's work is justified by the goal 
assigned to the theory. If acts are ranked according 
to expected utility then the preference over acts will 
be transitive, reflexive, and complete. In this paper, 
we do not want to require such a property a priori: 
the DM Preferences could be rational without being 
complete nor transitive (see Section 4). 
Now, let A � S be an event, f and g two acts, and 
denote by fAg the act such that: 
fA ( ) 
_ { f(s) i f  s E A g s - g(s) i f  sf. A. 
fAg is short for fAgA where A is the complement of A. 
Savage has proposed the sure-thing principle axiom, 
that requires that the preference between two acts fAh 
and gAh does not depend on the choice of h: 
Axiom S2 (Sure-thing principle). VA � S, 
V J, g, h, h' E X 5, (/Ah >;.:, gAh '¢:=} fAh' >;.:, gAh') 
Definition 1 (Conditional Preference) f is said 
to be weakly preferred to g, conditioned on A iff if 
Vh E X5,fAh >;.:, gAh. This is denoted by (J >;.:, g)A. 
Definition 2 (Null events) An event A is said to 
be null if and only if: V J, g, h E X5 : f Ah � gAh. 
Any event A � S unable to make a discrimination 
for at least one pair of acts is considered as null (e.g 
irrelevant for the DM). Note that this definition of null 
events is also consistent when >;.:, is not complete. 
Among acts in X 5 there are constant acts such that: 
:Jx EX : Vs E S, f(s) == x. Such an act will be denoted 
f x. It seems reasonable to identify the set of constant 
acts { f x, x E X} and X. The D M preference relation 
>;.:,p on X can be induced from (X5,>;.:,) as follows: 
Vx, y E X, (x >;.:,p y '¢:=} fx >;.:, jy) (6) 
Another hypothesis is that the preference order on con­
sequences is unique and does not depend on the events 
considered. This is the third Savage postulate: 
Axiom S3. VA � S,A not null, Ux >;.:, jy)A '¢:=} 
X >;.:,p y. 
The preference on acts also induces a likelihood rela­
tion among events: it is sufficient to consider the set 
of binary acts, of the form fxAfy, which thanks to 
(S3) can be denoted xAy , where x >-p y. Clearly for 
fixed x >-p y, the set of acts { x, y} 5 is isomorphic to 
the set of events 25. Since the restrictions of (X5, >;.:,) 
to { x, y} 5 may be inconsistent with the restriction to 
{ x', y'} 5 for other choices of consequences x', y' such 
that x' >-p y', Savage has introduced a new postulate: 
Axiom S4. VA,B � S, Vx,y, x', y' EX: x ?-p y and 
x' >-p y', xAy >;.:, xBy '¢:=} x' Ay' >;.:, x' By'. 
Under S4, the choice of x,y EX with x >-P y is not 
important when defining the ordering between events 
in terms of binary acts. Hence, the following likelihood 
relation on events can be derived from >;.:,: 
A >;.:,L B {o} (:Jx, y E X : x >-p y and xAy >;.:, xBy) (7) 
Lastly, Savage has assumed that the weakly ordered 
set (X, >;.:,P) is not trivial: 
Axiom S5. X contains at least two elements x, y 
such that fx >- fy (or x >-p y). 
Under S1-S5, the likelihood relation>;.:,£ on events is a 
comparative probability ordering (be S finite or not). 
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Finally, Savage introduces last postulates that enable 
him to derive the existence (and uniqueness) of a nu­
merical probability measure on 5 that can represent 
the likelihood relation;:;£. However, these axioms are 
omitted in the present paper because they are irrele­
vant for a finite set of states and for qualitative models. 
3. 2 THE QUALITATIVE INDEPENDENCE 
We propose now a new axiom aiming at specifying 
the qualitative nature of a preference model. This ax­
iom is an independence axiom that can be seen as the 
counterpart of an independence condition used in so­
cial choice theory (see Sen (1986)), completed with a 
neutrality condition making preferences independent 
of the labels of the acts considered. We call this ax­
iom Qualitative Independence: 
Axiom QI. Vh, g, h',g' E X5, [(h,g) = (h', g')] ===> 
(h;:; g {=} h';:; g'), where (h, g) = (h',g') stands 
for [Vs E 5, ( fh(s) ;:; f9(s) {=} !h•(s) ;:; f9•(s)) and 
(fg(s) ;:; !h(s) {=} fg•(s) ;:; fh'(sj)]. 
Note that, under 53, QI can be soundly rewritten as: 
Axiom QI'. [\'s E 5, (h(s) ;:;P g(s) {=} h'(s) ;:;P 
g'(s)) and (g(s) ;:;P h(s) {=} g'(s) ;:;P h'(s))] 
===> (h ;:; g {=} h' ;:; g') 
This new version of QI expresses that only the relative 
positions of the consequences of the two acts are im­
portant, but not the consequences themselves, nor the 
positions of the two acts relatively to other acts (i.e. 
the preference relation is not context dependent). As 
a consequence, Q I holds for preferences derived using 
the qualitative decision rules introduced in 2.3: 
Proposition 1 The general lifting rule (5) (whose 
definition supposes 52, 53 and 84) satisfies QI. 
Actually, when 53 is assumed, QI can be understood 
as a strong version of 52 and also of 54, as soon as ;:; 
is supposed to be reflexive. Indeed we have: 
Proposition 2 (83 + QI + ;:; reflexive) ===> 82 
Proposition 3 (53 + Ql + ;:; reflexive) ===> 54 
Since 52 and 54 hold, assuming 53 and 55 makes it 
possible to briefly state the following properties of the 
projection of;:; on 5, i.e. ;:;L as defined in (7): 
Proposition 4 (53 + 85 + QI + ;:; reflexive) ===> 
i) 5 >-£0, ii) \IA�5,A;:;d 
iii) \1 A � 5, 0 ;:;L A {=} A is null 
iv) B is null and A� B, then A is null 
v) ;:;L is additive 
Proposition 5 If;:; is complete on constant acts, re­
flexive, satisfies 53 and QI then there exists a prefer­
ence relation ;:;P on X defined by (6)and a likelihood 
relation ;:;L on 5 defined by (7) such that, for any 
f,g E X5, f;:; g {=} [ f ;:;P g] t£ [g ;:;P f] 
This provides a sufficient condition for DM prefer­
ences to be representable by a lifting rule. Then, using 
proposition 1 we get: 
Corollary 1 If the DM preference ;:; is complete on 
constant acts, reflexive on X5 and satisfies 53, QI 
holds if and only if ;:; is a lifting rule. 
This result provides a useful characterization of the 
lifting rule that can be used to justify this model in a 
practical situation. If QI is accepted as a norm for 
qualitative models, then the only available decision 
rules are lifting rules. This result holds even if;:; is not 
supposed to be complete, and thus concerns a wider 
class of lifting rules than those given in paragraph 2.3 
and in Dubois et a!. (1997). Under Ql, we get nice 
unanimity properties: whenever f is as least as good 
g for all possible states, f must be preferred to g: 
Proposition 6 If;:; satisfies 53, 55 and QI 
then 'lf,g E X5, ('is E 5,j(s) 'rp g(s)) ===> f >- g 
Vf,g E X5,(Vs E 5,f(s) ;:;P g(s)) ===> f ;:; g 
Moreover, if ;:; is complete then we get: 
'ij,g E X5, ((('is E 5, f(s) ;:;P g(s)) and 
(3s E S,s not null and f (s) 'rp g(s))) ===> f >-g) 
4 THE TRA NSITIVITY OF STRICT 
PREFERENCE 
The transitivity of preference resulting from a qualita­
tive decision rule is not obvious. This can be simply 
observed using the following example: 
Example 3 Suppose S = { s1, s2, s3} with probabil­
ities p(si) = p(s2) = p(s3) = 1/3. Consider 3 
consequences x, y, z E X such that x >-p y >-p 
z. Using the probabilistic lifting to compare the acts 
f = x{s1}y{s2}z{s3},g = y {s1}z{s2}x{s3} and h = 
z{st}x{s2}y{s3} we get [f ;: g] = {s1,s2}, [g ;: 
h] = {s1,s3} and [h ;:; f] = {s2,s3}) and there­
fore f >- g, g >- h and h >- f, i.e. an intransitive 
cycle. On the contrary if probabilities of states are 
p'(s1) = 0.6, p'(s2) = 0.3 and p'(s3) = 0.1 we get 
f >- g, g >- h and f >- h, a complete order. 
This example is actually derived from a Condorcet ef­
fect as those observed in Social choice (see e.g Sen, 
1986)). Let us briefly clarify the relationships with 
ordinal aggregation, defining for each state s E S a 
preference relation ;:;s by: 
Vf,g,EX5, J';::,.g {=} f(s)(,pg(s) (8) 
In this context, QI is a condition requiring that prefer­
ence f (, g only depends on partial preferences f '::,s g 
and g '::,sf, s E S, and not on the consequences f(s) 
and g(s), s E S themselves. Therefore, under QI, 
linking relation (, to the profile ('(,81 , • • •  , (, ,") can be 
seen as an ordinal aggregation problem, comparable to 
those studied in Social Choice Theory. 
From a descriptive point of view, example 3 shows 
the ability of qualitative decision rules to explain some 
cyclic preference structures and this is a really original 
point when compared to more classical models based 
on value functions. However, from a prescriptive point 
of view, the possibility of getting cyclic preferences is 
an important source of difficulty. For this reason, we 
investigate in this Section the possibility for qualita­
tive models to fulfill some minimal transitivity require­
ments. To this end, we must introduce new definitions 
concerning the decisiveness of events. 
4.1 DECISIVE EVENTS 
In example 3, considering the probability distribution 
p', it is easy to show that f >-p g holds as soon as 
f(sJ) >-p g(sJ) and thus, s2 and s3 are negligible with 
respect to s1. { s1} is said to be a decisive state: 
Definition 3 For any subsetS' <;; 8, an event A <;; 8' 
is said to be decisive in S' iff: V f, g E X 5, [[ (V s E 
8\ S',f(s) �P g(s)) and (Vs E A,f(s) ?-p g(s))] 
==? f >-g ]. A decisive event in S is called a decisive 
event. A decisive singleton is called a decisive state. 
In example 3, the transitivity is obtained using a very 
special structure: { s1} is a decisive state, { s2} is a de­
cisive state in { s2, s3} and this yields to the following 
hierarchy of decisive events {s!} >-L {s2,s3} >-L {s2} 
>-L { s3} which corresponds to a lexicographic prefer­
ence structure (see Fishburn, 1975). A weakening of 
decisiveness for states is defined by: 
Definition 4 For any subsetS' <;; 8, the state s' E 8' 
is said to be a vetoer in 8' iff: Vf,g E X5, [[(Vs E 
S\8',f(s) �P g(s))  and f(s') ?-p g(s')] ==? not(g >­
f)]]. A vetoer in 8 is simply called a vetoer. 
Definition 5 For any subsetS' <;; S, an event A <;; 8' 
is said to be predominant in 8' iff it is decisive in 8' 
and contains only vetoer-states in 8'. A predominant 
event in S is simply called a predominant event. 
4.2 MODELS COMPATIBLE WITH 
QUASI-TRANSITIVE PREFERENCES 
We consider here a very general framework where pref­
erences are not supposed to be transitive nor complete. 
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We only assume the quasi-transitivity of (,, e.g. the 
transitivity of its asymmetric part >-. This weak re­
quirement allows a wide class of preference models to 
be concerned, including those with an intransitive in­
difference (semi-orders, interval orders, see e.g Pirlot 
and Vincke (1997)) and those allowing incomparabil­
ity (see e.g. Roy, (1996) . We require only the total 
comparability of constants acts (i.e. the completness 
of (,p) which is a natural property because there is no 
conflict between states in the comparison of constant 
acts. Hence we consider the following axiom that can 
be seen as a useful weakening of S 1. 
Axiom AI. (, is reflexive and quasi-transitive, and 
its restriction to constant acts is complete. 
Moreover, as far as transitivity properties are con­
cerned, we need to consider at least three distinct levels 
on X and strengthen axiom S5 with the following: 
Axiom A5. X contains at least three consequences 
x, y and z such that fx >-fy >-fz. 
Then we establish the two following technical lemmas: 
Lemma 1 If(, satisfies Al, AS, 83, and QI then the 
following property holds for any non-empty subset A 
of 8: [3f,g E X5 : ([j ?-p g] = A, [ g  >-p f] = 
S \A and f >-g)] ==? A is decisive 
Lemma 2 If(, satisfies Al, AS, 83, and QI then 8 
contains at most one predominant event. 
Hence we get the following theorem: 
Theorem 1 If(, satisfies Al, AS, 83 and QI, there 
exists one and only one predominant event 0 in S and 
the resulting subjective likelihood relation >-L on events 
has the following properties: 
i) VA, B £;; S, (An B = 0 and A>-£ B)=? 0 n B = 0 
ii) VA, B £;; S, (An B = 0 and 0 £;;A)=? A 'rL B 
iii) VA£;; S, 0 £;;A {==} A>-£ S \A 
In other terms, when the DM preferences are quasi­
transitive and compatible with QI, they necessarily 
rely on a knowledge structure admitting a predomi­
nant event 0 which makes negligible any other disjoint 
event. Indeed f >-g holds as soon as f is preferred to 
g for all states belonging to 0. Moreover, whenever 
two states s and s' are conflicting within 0 concerning 
a pair f,g (i.e. f(s) ?-p g(s) and g(s') ?-p f(s')), no 
strict preference can be stated between the two acts. 
In Social Choice Theory, such a preference structure is 
said to be oligarchic (see e.g. Sen (1986)). The larger 
is 0, the less decisive the procedure. In case of to­
tal ignorance, i.e. when no state of the world is more 
likely than another, we get 0 = 8: the preference re­
lation (, reduces to the functional dominance on X5. 
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In the other extreme case, 0 contains a single state, 
the DM preferences can be described by a "  dictatorial" 
decision rule due to the existence of a decisive state s. 
Such a rule can emerge when the DM is almost certain 
than the "true state" is s and that the other states are 
negligible: all the other possible futures are ignored. 
More precisely, we can derive the following result: 
Corollary 2 If axioms Al, AS, S3,and QI hold, there 
exists a unique maximaP partition of S into events 
01' ... 'ok' k > 1 such that 01 is predominant and 
Vj: 2::; j < k, event Oj is predominant in S\U{;;;i 0; 
thus yielding to a hierarchy of predominant events. 
This result is well illustrated by possibilistic and neces­
sity lifting rules for which A1, A5, S3 and QI hold. The 
possibilistic lifting corresponds to the case where only 
one predominant event 01 exists. It is simply defined 
by the core of the distribution, e.g the set of states hav­
ing a maximal possibility: 01 = {s E S : 7r (s) = 1}. 
The necessity lifting rule corresponds to the case with 
possibly several levels in the hierarchy, i.e. one for 
each distinct level-cut of the distribution 7r on S. 
Now, assuming both completeness and transitivity of 
� we obtain a hierarchy of predominant states: 
Theorem 2 For any preference relation among acts 
that satisfies Sl, 83, AS and QI, we have, for all pairs 
/, g E xs 
{
 3s E S, not null, f(s) >-p g(s) 
f >- g ¢=? 'is E S, (g(s) >-p f (s) => 3s' E S :  
{s'} >-L {s} and f(s') >-P g(s')) 
This theorem shows the lexicographic structure of pref­
erence and can be seen as a counterpart of Fishburn's 
theorem obtained in the context of multicriteria anal­
ysis (see F ishburn, 1975). It demonstrates a phe­
nomenon which was already illustrated in example 3 
and also explains that comparative probabilities (and 
not only classical probabilities) are incompatible with 
a qualitative approach of decision. The resulting lexi­
cographic rule corresponds to a very particular struc­
ture of uncertainty in which all the non impossible 
states must be linearly ordered. As a consequence, 
this forbids the description of total ignorance (where 
the states are equally plausible). Moreover, there ex­
ists a predominant state s*, more plausible that any 
other state, and even more plausible than the event 
S \ { s*}. As soon as s* gives a better consequence for 
an act than for another one, the first act is preferred. 
The other possible states of the world are negligible 
compared to s* and only considered when the domi­
nant state does not allow the discrimination between 
the acts. The decision is then based on the next plau­
sible state ... 
2maximal means here that no other partition of S re­
fining this one has the same property 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The results obtained in Section 4 are rather negative 
since they underline the poor descriptive ability of 
models satisfying both QI and the quasi-transitivity 
of preferences. For this reason, we have investigated 
possible weakening of our initial axiomatic framework. 
A first idea is relaxing axiom S3, arguing that the pref­
erence order on consequences may actually depend on 
the state of the world considered. However, using S2 
we can soundly3 define, for each state Sj E S, a pref­
erence relation �j on X by setting: 
'Vx,y E X, X �P; Y ¢=? Ux � /y){s;) 
Hence, from each relation �P; we can define a prefer­
ence relation �j on X s by setting: 
Thus, under QI, linking relation � to the profile (� 1 
, ... , �n) is still an ordinal aggregation problem with 
similar difficulties (see Sen(1986)). Thus, cancelling 
S3 does not really provide new possibilities. 
A second possibility is to relax partially the quasi­
transitivity of � on X8. In practical applications, 
most of the acts in X s are purely imaginary and per­
haps not even feasible. Hence, one can be tempted to 
require quasi-transitivity only on feasible acts. How­
ever, using example 3, we could show that this does 
not provide new possibilities as long as there exists a 
feasible subset of acts X'8' where X' � X contains at 
least 3 distinct elements and S' c;; S contains at least 
3 non-null states. We could also consider a relaxation 
of quasi-transitivity for acyclicity, i.e., If f0, ... , fk E 
X8, ((Vi= 1, . . . , k, fi-1 >-/;) => not(fk >-fo)). In­
deed, acyclicity is sufficient to soundly define a choice 
function selecting the best elements among any non 
empty subset of X8: 
VY c;; X8, C(Y) = {! E Y :  Vg E Y,not(g >-f)} 
However, we have also investigated this relaxation and 
proved that qualitative decision models compatible 
with acyclicity have also very special features. For 
example, they necessarily provide some state with an 
absolute veto, thus limiting the role of other states. 
The last possibility is to relax axiom QI which turns 
out to be a very demanding condition. If we are in­
terested in developing a purely ordinal framework for 
decision under uncertainty, the most natural weaken­
ing of QI is to cancel the "independence" side of the 
382 can be seen as an independence condition allowing 
to derive one-dimensional preference relations from �- For 
more details see e.g. Fishburn and Wakker (1995) 
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condition while keeping the "ordinal" side. A good so­
lution for this is to assume that the preference f ;:; g 
not only depends on preferences f (s) ;:;P g(s), for 
all s, but also on preferences of type f (s) ;:;P h(s), 
g(s) ;:;P h(s), h(s) ;:;P f(s), h(s) ;:;P f (s) for some h 
in X5. This solution has been proposed in the frame­
work of multicriteria Decision Making so as to over­
come difficulties due to Arrow-like theorems (see e.g. 
Ferny 1992, Bouyssou and Ferny 1992). In the frame­
work of qualitative decision theory, it should be useful 
to follow the same path and to investigate non-binary 
preferences. As a first set of examples, consider the 
following relations: 
f!::J.tg = 
f!::J.J;g = 
(f !:::; h] !:::;L [g!:::; h] 
[h !:::; g] !:::;L [h!:::; fl 
where h E X is a reference point within X5 used 
to specify the aspiration levels of the DM, for each 
state of the nature. The idea underlying these rules 
is to compare acts by evaluating their relative abilities 
in satisfying or missing the D M aspirations. Another 
interesting set of examples is given by the following 
qualitative dominance relations: 
f!::J.+g = 'lx EX,[/!:::; fx] !:::;L[g!:::; fx] 
f!::J.-g = VxEX, [fx!:::;g]!:::;L[fx!:::;f] 
These relations must be regarded as natural quali­
tative counterparts of the so-called stochastic domi­
nance relation used in decision under probabilistic un­
certainty (see Levy (1992) for a survey on this topic). 
Clearly, all these relations are transitive but not nec­
essarily complete. When ;:; is constructed from one 
of these rules, unanimity holds but not the QI axiom 
and the theorems of this paper do not apply. These 
examples open new perspectives for designing purely 
qualitative preference models without QI. This is left 
for further investigation. 
Further work also includes a parallel Savage-like ax­
iomatic study of models based on the comparison of 
the consequences of the acts in the most plausible 
states (see (Boutilier 1994; Tan and Pearl 1994; Braf­
man and Tennenholtz 1996, 1997)). These models do 
not require preference over consequences and uncer­
tainty to be commensurate and do not obey the QI 
requirement, but the associated decision rules, when 
they are explicit, also focus on a decisive set of states: 
the set of most plausible states. Our approach may 
also be compatible with generalized qualitative prob­
abilites (Lehman (1996)), that are incomplete orders 
of uncertainty and that require both the transitivity 
of the indifference relation and unanimity properties 
stronger than ours. Moreover, generalized qualitative 
probabilities encompass a notion of neglectibility be­
tween events whose links with our notion of decisive­
ness should be studied. 
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